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of the Dolphin recounts for public consumption details his aspiration to achieve an unprecedented
breakthrough beyond companionate communion to fully abstract linguistic communication across
species boundaries. Between 1959 and 1968 Lilly wagered and lost his mainstream scientific career
largely over this audacious, ultimately inconclusive bid to establish and document for scientific
validation “communication with a nonhuman mind.” In that effort, however, he mobilized the best
available tools, a cutting-edge array of cybernetic concepts. He leaned heavily on the information
theory bound up with first-order cybernetics and operated with heuristic computational metaphors
alongside the actual computers of his era. As I will elicit through some close readings of his texts, in
that process Lilly also homed in on crucial epistemological renovations with a constructivist
redescription of cognition that may have influenced and motivated his colleague Heinz von Foerster’s
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Since his death at the age of eighty-six in 2001, one can detect a bit of an upsurge 
of scholarly interest in John C. Lilly, M.D.1 Up until the present millennium, Lilly 
would have been deemed more notorious than renowned, remembered more often 
for his later exploits as an extreme psychonaut than for the scientific career 
leading up to those self-documented “autobiographies of inner space.” However, 
that notoriety followed upon a period of national prominence as a behavioral 
physiologist turned dolphin researcher and well-received author of the popular 
scientific volumes Man and Dolphin (1961) and The Mind of the Dolphin: A 
Nonhuman Intelligence (1967). Then, in a series of professional and personal 
memoirs spanning the 1970s—including his first research report on psychedelic 
self-exploration, Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human 
Biocomputer (1969), as well as The Center of the Cyclone: An Autobiography of 
Inner Space (1972), The Dyadic Cyclone: The Autobiography of a Couple, co-
written with Antonietta Lilly (1976), and The Scientist: A Novel Autobiography 
(1978)—Lilly chronicled his own transition from lion of the international 
scientific mainstream to psychic pioneer scouting the cosmic reaches of the 
American counterculture.  
 The primary theme I will use to map a route through a small selection of 
Lilly’s multifarious writings and personal transformations at the cusp of his mid-
life transition is communication. When Lilly left his position as section head at 
the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) in 1958 to concentrate on 
dolphin research, he named the private scientific operation he founded, with an 
office in Miami, Florida, and laboratories on the island of St. Thomas, the 
Communication Research Institute (CRI). While at the NIMH, Lilly had invented 
the isolation tank, the flotation chamber and sensory-deprivation device 
eventually made famous in the movie Altered States. In the mid-1950s Lilly 
embarked on a prolonged course of experimentation, largely upon himself, 
exploring the psychic states to be discovered floating in the tank. These 
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researches formed a parallel experimental track during the years of dolphin 
research at CRI, from 1959 to 1968. His applications of LSD within both research 
programs began only in the mid-1960s. But their effects, I speculate, were 
instrumental in the way that his communications research devoted to interspecies 
exchange with dolphins eventually lapsed as he pursued a post-scientific round of 
therapeutic, sociopolitical, epistemological, and cosmological messages for his 
fellow humans. Lilly’s scientific purpose of theorizing communication through 
experiments testing its species boundaries developed into the narration of 
phenomenal events beyond the bounds of any common human experience. 
However, in the period of the later 1960s I will focus on, Lilly’s theorizations of 
communication arrived at innovative applications of first-order cybernetics and 
information theory. I will be particularly concerned to develop a systems-
theoretical observation of Lilly’s cybernetics of communication in The Mind of 
the Dolphin. 
 
The Mind of the Dolphin 
On October 24, 1967, Heinz von Foerster, the director of the Biological Computer 
Laboratory (BCL) in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University 
of Illinois, prepared to send John Lilly a packet of professional correspondence. 
His cover letter began: “Dear John, I cannot tell you how grateful I am for your 
sending me your Eighth Annual Report. It gives me new fuel for my perpetual 
admiration of your work—if this refueling were necessary at all.”2 To tell from 
von Foerster’s letter, it covered his own summary of recent BCL activities and 
some BCL reprints and lab reports with an explanation that clarifies to some 
extent the object of his admiration: “For us, your work on inter-species symbolic 
discourse was most significant in developing the concepts we tried to formulate.” 
Von Foerster’s packet also included a $5.00 check in response to a book notice 
Lilly had sent along for his popular trade volume just released by Doubleday, The 
Mind of the Dolphin: A Nonhuman Intelligence.3  
 The Mind of the Dolphin is no light read. The preface declares that its 
“main ideas and formulations are a theory to scientifically penetrate into the area 
of at least one nonhuman mind, that of the bottlenose dolphin” (xi). Left 
indeterminate by this statement is whether or not—since the very possibility of 
bringing about the contemplated event in actual practice had not yet been 
determined—the scientific penetration to be achieved is only theoretical. For 
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 Heinz von Foerster to John C. Lilly, typescript dated October 24, 1967, Heinz von 
Foerster papers, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
3
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actual as opposed to theoretical penetration into a nonhuman mind would mean a 
successful instance of establishing interspecies communication through some as 
yet unknown or undiscovered relation by which that nonhuman mind would 
reveal its own thoughts to a human interlocutor in a mutually understandable 
medium. The eight-year-old project that The Mind of the Dolphin recounts in 
1967 details the uncanny aspiration to achieve an unprecedented breakthrough 
beyond companionate communion to fully abstract linguistic communication 
across species boundaries. 
 Between 1959 and 1968 Lilly wagered and lost his mainstream scientific 
career largely over this audacious, ultimately inconclusive bid to establish and 
document for scientific validation “communication with a nonhuman mind” (xi). 
In that effort, however, he mobilized the best available tools, a cutting-edge array 
of cybernetic concepts. He leaned heavily on the information theory bound up 
with first-order cybernetics and operated with heuristic computational metaphors 
alongside the actual computers of his era. As I will elicit through some close 
readings of his texts, in that process Lilly also homed in on crucial 
epistemological renovations with a constructivist redescription of cognition that 
may have influenced and motivated his colleague von Foerster’s more renowned  
formulations, arriving in the early 1970s at a second-order cybernetics.4 In 
subsequent decades the discourse of second-order cybernetics —epitomized in the 
concept of autopoiesis—would provide Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory a 
conceptual base for its own discourse of communication. I will call upon 
Luhmann’s work at times to compare with Lilly’s earlier cybernetic discourse of 
communication. Embedded in the cetology of The Mind of the Dolphin, then, is an 




Much of the weight Lilly rested on his discourse of communication in The Mind 
of the Dolphin came from therapeutic concerns inculcated by his medical and 
                                                          
4
 The classic text here is Heinz von Foerster, “On Constructing a Reality” (1973), in 
Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition (New York: 
Springer, 2003), 211-27. See also Heinz von Foerster, The Beginning of Heaven and 
Earth Has No Name: Seven Days with Second-Order Cybernetics, eds. Albert Müller 
and Karl H. Müller, trans. Elinor Rooks and Michael Kasenbacher (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2013). 
5
 On the modern overdetermination of the concept of communication, see John Durham 
Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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psychoanalytic trainings. This background informed his presentation of research 
into interspecies communication as administering to goals of individual and 
collective mental health with cures for human pathologies of communication. For 
instance: “one’s own beliefs below his usual levels of awareness prevent complete 
communication with self and with other persons. Our species has not achieved 
equality of communication. . . . Communication with other peoples fails; we have 
international conflicts in most of the world” (xiii). However, the very breadth of 
Lilly’s discourse of communication generated its own problems of equivocation, 
and ultimately, of conceptual overreach. In the remark just above, “complete 
communication” would indicate not just serviceable understandings concerning 
basic social matters of shared concern. Rather, such “completion” ought to issue 
in an “equality” of agreement or consensus to the point of complete mutual 
understanding or spiritual communion.  As social systems theory would lead one 
to expect, the overdetermined ideality of communication in Lilly’s treatment 
fomented equivocal oscillations between psychic and social references, amplified 
by putting “mind” and “communication” into such tight tandem without adequate 
conceptual means to account for their differentiation. 
 While ideals such as “equality of communication” underscored the liberal 
humanism residing in Lilly’s overt scientific rationales, they also indicated the 
difficulties built into his dream of equality for interspecies communication. For a 
bona fide “penetration” to occur, nothing less than an articulate exchange of 
interspecies intimacies would really do, and until that moment arrived, on the 
human end his research team could only keep faith in the hope that their project 
was possible: 
If and when dolphins and we do establish communication on a 
highly abstract level, the proof will become obvious and 
incontestable. In this book I give some of the details of this 
developing picture and give the reasons why we, the ones who 
work with them, must rely for some time on our faith in their 
intelligence. This faith is in the working hypothesis that both we 
and they are intelligent enough to break the interspecies 
communication barrier between these very different minds. (84; 
emphasis in the original) 
Lilly’s supersonic metaphor of the “interspecies communication barrier” offered 
an inappropriately material or physical image for the immaterial operational 
closures of the autopoietic systems that would have to be successfully coupled 
(not “broken” or “penetrated”) to yield the expanded social system that would 
result from an actual episode of interspecies communication. But what this 
metaphor did capture is the pathos of “penetration” when the object to be opened 
up is not precisely palpable—is not a brain, but a mind.  
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 Let us pause to recall that Lilly began his scientific career as a 
neurophysiologist developing penetrative techniques for behavioral research on 
mammalian brains, culminating in papers of the later 1950s such as “Learning 
Elicited by Electrical Stimulation of Subcortical Regions in the Unanesthetized 
Monkey,” and “Learning Motivated by Subcortical Stimulation: The ‘Start’ and 
‘Stop’ Patterns of Behavior.” As communication researcher John Shiga explains: 
“In these experiments, Lilly inserted electrodes into various regions of a 
monkey’s brain, sent electric current through the electrode, and recorded the 
animal’s behavior and its neurological activity. The implanted electrodes enabled 
Lilly to map neural networks and to link sensory events, muscle movements and 
other behaviors to patterns of activity in those networks.”6 The goal, then, to 
“scientifically penetrate into the area of at least one nonhuman mind” marks a 
transition from neurophysiological materiality to psychological intangibility. This 
metaphysical trend is uttered through a metaphorical statement, heavily laden 
with material-physiological connotations, not for the actual piercing of a material 
sheath or organic membrane but for the effective elaboration of a virtual 
communication medium by which to couple two different species in “complete” 
communication at a fully abstract level of meaning construction. 
 
Projection 
In Lilly’s efforts to craft not only theories but also experimental protocols for 
“complete communication” with dolphins, one difficulty was to establish the 
requisite controls against an observer’s misconstruing a random instance of 
cetacean phonation as a humanly meaningful abstract utterance. For human 
beings generally as well, “this problem of projection blocks a large fraction of 
true communication” (3). Projection short-circuits a proper understanding of what 
others are thinking or meaning to convey when they make a communicative offer. 
However, the paradox built into Lilly’s experimental situation can be said to take 
this form: unless you’ve already succeeded in communicating, you can’t even 
know the status of your attempts. Or again, without communication having 
already been established, how is one to ask the dolphin to confirm if one has 
understood it correctly the first time? Yet it would seem that in relation to 
interspecies communication, the problem of projection cannot be circumvented, it 
can only be controlled for by a trial-and-error protocol maintained at the human 
end until the moment arrives when the dolphin itself begins to assist in the 
correction process: 
We use the following working hypotheses in our communication 
research with dolphins: The airborne whistles and the airborne 
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clicks are attempts to communicate with us as they do with one 
another, i.e., attempts to induce us to use their mode of 
communication. . . . Their humanoid sounds in air are their 
approximations to our communication sounds as distorted by their 
hearing and by their phonation apparatus. . . . With the humanoid 
sounds, dolphins are attempting to communicate with us in our 
mode of communication. (83; emphases in the original) 
In his Theory of Society, Luhmann draws out the immanent improbability of any 
communication whatsoever. He notes that the extreme contingency of 
communicative success “is hardly ever posed so drastically” as one finds in his 
treatment of the topic: “the fact that a system of society actually exists and 
reproduces communication through communication . . . is extremely improbable. 
Only communication makes itself probable. . . . If the individual components of 
communication [information, utterance, understanding] are in themselves 
improbable, their synthesis is all the more so” (1:113-14). Applying Luhmann’s 
theoretical descriptions to Lilly’s project, the higher improbability of interspecies 
communication would also follow from the higher incommensurability of alien 
psychic systems, the radical difference of which would tend to deter the formation 
of any medium of meaning to which a hybrid, interspecies social system could 
couple itself such that human and dolphin individuals could arrive at 
commensurate understandings of communicative offers. And here again is a 
formulation of the Catch-22 or logical quandary in which Lilly’s project is caught: 
only interspecies communication could make interspecies communication 
probable. In the human instance, the communications produced by social systems 
have had eons to evolve in coevolutionary step with neurological and psychic 
systems. Can the formation of an interspecies social system really be jumpstarted 
in a few weeks or years, especially when one species is landborne and the other 
aquatic? Talk about the improbability of communication! Lilly’s immanently 
improbable effort can proceed only on the prayers (since while any conclusive 
evidence for these assumptions may be “developing,” it has not yet arrived) that 
the nonhuman beings to be communicated with are comparably communicative 
within their own societal forms, and moreover, that interspecies communication is 
not just possible but desired on both sides of the potential exchange. In other 
words, to gain any traction at all, Lilly must force the issue. His project must be 
built on the projection of its desired outcome: 
We must keep the working hypothesis in mind that “they are 
highly intelligent and are just as interested in communicating with 
us as we are with them.”. . . If we use any other hypothesis, we 
have no success whatsoever in dealing communicatively with 
them. This hypothesis seems to be necessary and even overriding 
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to accomplish the kinds of communication we are accomplishing 
and attempting to expand. The proof, the incontrovertible truth, 
that they are interested in this communication is developing slowly 
and carefully in our laboratory. (83) 
 And in any event, as Lilly goes on to assert, the mechanism behind the 
problem of projection—the psychic generation of mental models—is also at the 
root of cognition altogether. In line with the cybernetic vogue of the 1960s, Lilly 
endows that central mechanism with a fully mechanistic description. 
Complementing his implicitly cybernetic focus on communication, Lilly 
introduces an explicit computational analogue for the mammalian brain. Like a 
computer programmed to simulate a real-world process, that brain generates 
models for the mind to use, and at times, misuse. Addressing the matter of 
projection, he asks “How do we do this wishful, false realizing? Our relatively 
large minds (brains) act as computers that can make models inside themselves of 
other human minds and their activities” (3). Now, social systems theory would 
redescribe the matter of projection in a post-computational manner, as a normal 
problem set of observation and attribution for operationally closed meaning 
systems. Projection is a momentary or prolonged negation of internal or self-
reference in favor of an uncorroborated external or hetero-referential attribution. 
Moreover, in first-order observation, self-reference is blocked as a matter of 
course.7 That is, psychic events arise altogether as internal or systemic selections 
that the mind can check for referential consistency only by participating in society 
and thus enabling others to form and communicate second-order observations as 
corrective or affirmative responses to one’s own utterances.  
 Returning to Lilly’s psychic cybernetics, we are informed that only 
specific areas of the brain are “hard wired” for specific tasks, while much of it is 
“general purpose”: this readiness for variable programming “is the saving grace 
which allows one individual to communicate with another. . . . The important 
common power is the ability of this brain to assume the tasks of making models 
of creatures and persons in its surrounds. This is the fundamental property which 
allows communication to take place” (7). Lilly bases this theorization of 
communication upon a loosely specified ability of the brain to “take on” the 
commonality of communication’s semiotic medium—language: “We can develop 
and share a language among uniquely different individuals because each of those 
individuals can take on enough of the commonality of language within his own 
brain to allow communication” (7). And yet the commonality of language 
immediately runs up against the privacy of thought: “But we must never forget 
that the thinking processes of the individual are still uniquely his or hers. Only 
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certain aspects are common and shared” (7). Which aspects? Well, language. Lilly 
does the best he can with the psycholinguistics he has at hand, but his theory 
cannot break out of the mere circularity of these formulations. Still, his intuition 
for the closure of consciousness is properly presented. Lilly rightly insists on the 
impossibility of penetrating to the possession of a fellow human’s thoughts: “We 
may have the illusion of penetrating completely into the mental life of another 
human being through language, but this is impossible. Each of us is so uniquely 
different and so uniquely himself that we cannot yet so penetrate” (7). And these 
considerations of the limits of human knowledge are then to be pointed toward the 
problem of the absolutely alien mind of the dolphin. 
 As we have already noted, the theoretical penetration of the mind of the 
dolphin Lilly introduced in his preface does not mean any material or spiritual 
seizure of its contents but rather, simply but decisively, the establishment of a 
relation of communication. Any mind is black-boxed, self-possessed of an 
inviolable mental privacy whose only inlets and outlets depend upon events of 
communicative reception and utterance. It is in this context that Lilly obliquely 
introduces into his dolphin discourse the deep background of his experimentation 
with the isolation tank.8  
No one wants to be insulated and isolated for long from his fellow 
human beings. In experiments in which I have isolated volunteer 
subjects and in experiences in which others have isolated 
themselves, it is shown that the major need that develops in the 
isolation experience is transactions with others, i.e., 
communication. This need can be temporarily satisfied by 
hallucinating and talking to the “projected” persons in the 
solitudinous surroundings. (8) 
 With this allusion to the isolation tank, the topic of projection recurs in his 
text not as a pathology of communication but rather as a sort of involuntary 
protective reflex, an affective-ideational immune response. The isolation tank 
provides a literal materialization of the operational closure of the psychic system, 
momentarily structurally decoupled from any possibility of “true” 
communication. When you are in the tank, no one can hear you communicate. 
And so, hallucinatory projection provides an emergency solution to the terrors of 
extreme isolation by intuiting companionship to counter the momentary 
impossibility of communication. In Lilly’s cybernetic idiom, and especially as 
induced by immersion within an isolation tank, hallucinations are particular 
projective phenomena that compute internal models of outer things and then insert 
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them into a larger model of the mind’s external environment. The mind in 
artificial isolation invents and populates its own world, similar to or different than 
the world outside the tank, but in any event without recourse to the usual 
consistency checks of actual communication. 
 
Self-Reference 
If Lilly himself were to be the first human explorer to make contact across the 
species boundary to the mind of the dolphin, he could not at the same time stand 
outside the circuit of communication he hoped to achieve. In his current 
experimental sphere of sentient encounter between large-brained mammals, any 
traditional methodological move to remove himself from the stage of his 
experimental theater would create “paradoxes. Man himself must be included. 
The scientist himself must be in his system” (28). Lilly’s statement anticipates the 
self-referential turn that second-order cybernetics will soon generalize to all 
occasions of observation. But by acknowledging the experimenter’s presence 
within the system to be observed, he is not so much escaping from paradox as 
presciently engaging with the basal paradox of observing systems as that will be 
codified in second-order systems theory.9 From the positivist point of view of 
normal science, of course, Lilly draws paradox to himself just by entering the 
circle of his own experiment and so collapsing any stance of objective 
detachment. Nonetheless, Lilly remained fastidious in maintaining an awareness 
of methodological distinction between hetero- and self-reference, in this instance, 
between “fact and theory”: “In my work as a generalist, I use the model of the 
physicists and their separation rule. I separate the fact and theory rigorously in my 
own mind. In addition, experimenter and the parts of himself functioning in the 
system under investigation are separated as far as is practical” (29). Nonetheless, 
in order to perform this notional separation he can only step once more into the 
circle of paradox, holding together in his own person the unity of the distinction 
between self- and hetero-observation.  
 Lilly’s observational paradox is only compounded in this text written for a 
general audience by his desire both to share and to guard the revelatory 
experiences that are backstage-managing the self-referential renovations to his 
scientific practice: 
If one succeeds in having a religious revelation, the significance is 
steeped in a perspective so vast as to generate an awe from which 
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he cannot recover. . . . Such experiences are not yet admitted to the 
halls of conventional science. A major difficulty is that unless 
another person has had such experience, he cannot share the 
wonder and the awe of one’s own inner experiences. . . . The truth 
of what one presents is not subject to the usual tests of evidence as 
devised in the courts and the sciences. (35-36) 
Although unspoken as yet in this text, Lilly labors here to contain his LSD 
experiences, begun in 1964, within the proprieties of standard objective discourse. 
Communication of this sort is another problem constituted by the closure of 
individual experience, especially for those private experiences that permanently 
alter one’s relation to the world. Understanding of the revelatory information that 
he could utter greatly depends on the mental and experiential preparation of its 
recipient. In this manner the problematics of interspecies and intraspecies 
communication intersect. 
 One rhetorical strategy Lilly develops in this text for rendering impersonal 
information about himself is his recourse, however strained, to a third-person 
stance. Another such strategy—concurrently undergoing full development in 
Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer—is the 
coupling of that expository voice to an idiom and conceptual allegory steeped in 
cybernetics. Channeling his personal experiences and theoretical stances through 
the affectless tones of classical computerese nicely induces a scientistic flattening 
of the delivery. For instance: 
In this theoretical view which we are generating, theories are 
analogous to computer metaprograms. One’s own brain is 
analogous to a huge computer larger than any built today. The 
theories (programs and metaprograms) stored in one’s self operate 
the way a stored program in a modern computer operates. The 
stored program gives the orders for the data acquisition, the 
computations to be done, the logic to be used, the models to 
employ, the new models to be constructed, the end use of the 
results, and the outputs to be chosen to carry out the end uses. 
Thus, to test a given theory, one “programs” himself with the as-
complete-as-possible theory and joins the system under 
investigation as a participant-computer operating “on line.” (92) 
The self-referential element returns in the self-programming of the “scientist in 
the system” as a “participant computer” running a theoretical metaprogram to be 
put to the experimental test in real time. If one discounts the earnest intentions at 
play in this edgy science, Lilly might as well be composing a posthuman strain of 
performance art. Let us call it experimental performance science, in which, in this 
cybernetic milieu, the experimenter self-fashions himself not just as a participant 
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observer but as a computational device coupled into the system to be observed, 
open to on-line learning and real-time reprogramming and, as prophylaxis against 
projection,  impervious to emotional distraction: “one streamlines himself for the 
program. If one is going to be a participant computer, he must get rid of excess 
emotional baggage. Excessive guilt has to be eliminated. Personal blind spots and 
tender pain-shame areas must be changed or erased. The model of the computer 
itself which one is striving for contains no personal blocks against finding the 
truth no matter where it lies” (95).  
 
Redefining Information 
Chapter 4 of The Mind of the Dolphin is titled “Communication Is between 
Minds.” The crucial distinction implied by this statement is that communication is 
not merely between brains. It is not simply a matter of sequential sensory-
neurological transmissions and receptions. The threshold of mind arrives with the 
higher-order computations that allow for metaprogramming and general-purpose 
modeling. The definition of communication now receiving explicit statement 
works backward from this distinction of mind: 
Definition: Communication is the exchange of information between 
two or more minds. (99) 
Nonetheless, as the term “exchange” indicates, Lilly’s scheme of communication 
comes out of an informatic matrix still wedded to a data-transmission model. Lilly 
provides a diagram directly adapting the famous diagram of a communication 
system in Warren Weaver’s introduction to his and Claude Shannon’s 
Mathematical Theory of Communication.10 Nonetheless, key differences emerge 
from their comparison. The interest for us will be in the ways that Lilly, for one, 
finesses classical information theory in order to open up a conceptual residence 
for mind (an entity seldom elicited in standard informatic discourse), and for 
another, provides some preliminary sketches for a constructivist epistemology.  
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 Warren Weaver, “Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of 
Communication,” in Warren Weaver and Claude Shannon, The Mathematical Theory 
of Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949), 3-28. 
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 Figure 1 – John Lilly’s Schema of the Definition of Communication in 
Dolphin 
 
Regarding his schema of communication,
mind (M) on the left in the circle contained in brain 1 (the square) transmitting 
signals to mind (M) in the circle on the right contained within brain 2, the square. 
In turn, mind 2 is sending signals to mind 1” (102). 
diagram of information transmission:
 
Figure 2 – Warren Weaver’s diagram of information transmission from 
Mathematical Theory of Communication
 
Information theory per se is oriented to technological systems. Weaver’s diagram 
is modeled on a telephone system and focuses on signal conversion, signal load, 
and signal loss, for which depiction a one
diagram is ostensibly oriented to embodied minds and depicts a minimal social 
system—in Luhmann’s idiom, an interaction system. At the same time, his brain
mind composites are also, at least in the heuristics of his theory, 
and this psychophysiology comes forward in a strongly cybernetic frame. Thus 
Lilly’s diagram can be unfolded toward Shannon and Weaver’s technological 
scheme by momentarily positing the mind in brain 1 as the information source, 
the mind in brain 2 as th
aspects of signal transmission and reception respectively. However, as Lilly 
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operates his diagram, the key turn is this: “The information is not generated from 
these signals until the signals are received, computed, and turned into the 
information by each of the minds in turn. This is the essential core of our 
definition of communication” (102-3). 
 Purveying a common equivocation in communication theory, what Lilly 
here terms information is more precisely the meanings constructed by either mind 
as a result of their social “exchange.” Since he is still working in a first-order 
informatic idiom, Lilly deploys an equivalent distinction between “signal” and 
“information.” However, in importing the brain-mind couple into the informatic 
diagram, and in drawing a circle around mind relative to the brain, Lilly’s scheme 
adumbrates a constructivist or second-order distinction between information and 
meaning. Perhaps I am projecting what I want to find, but it seems to me that by 
introducing mind into his scheme and so “placing new boundaries on information 
theory” (105), Lilly’s biocomputational model posits a strong anticipation of the 
operational boundaries to be codified in Luhmann’s metabiotic appropriation of 
autopoiesis for the production of consciousness and communication in psychic 
and social systems: 
The information does not exist as information until it is within the 
higher levels of abstraction of each of the minds and computed as 
such. . . . Information is the result of a long series of computations 
based on data signal inputs, data signal transmissions to the brain 
substance, and recomputations of these data. . . . The schema of 
the definition shows that one must differentiate very carefully 
between “signals” and “information.”  In this view, a set of signals 
. . . is not information; it becomes so only if and when it enters, is 
computed, and changes the contents of a mind. . . . In other words, 
our boundary for information is at a level of discourse of Cogito 
ergo sum, “I think (or I know), therefore I am.” Information is that 
which I know now, coming from outside me, and coming from the 
storage inside me, allowing for delays in computation and in 
transmission. . . . The mind of the observer-participant is where the 
information is constructed, by and through his own programs, his 
own rules of perception, his own cognitive and logical processes, 
his own metaprogram of priorities among programs.  (103-4; 
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The Signal-Noise Ratio 
With the inscription of the “observer-participant” into the interactive construction 
of meaningful information for communicative exchange between minds, Lilly 
now elicits the component of informatic noise left over from the Warren Weaver 
diagram of information flow. But unlike their simple addition of a noise source to 
signal transmission, Lilly imports and distributes information theory’s 
signal/noise ratio across his scheme of communication: “the signal/noise ratio is a 
definable entity only when each of two minds agrees on the definition of what is 
‘signal’ and what is ‘noise’” (105).11 However, having underscored that 
communication demands social agreement on how to distinguish meaningful 
forms from the randomness of their medium, Lilly now focuses on the individual 
mind’s self-generation of meaning forms, and his train of exposition arrives once 
more at the station of physical isolation inducing psychic projection as a source of 
mental formations. Given a prolonged contemplation of a noisy process, one may 
begin to “‘make signals out of the noise’ by introducing systematic changes into 
the noise. In profound physical isolation, this process can be shown most 
dramatically. Our minds project a pattern onto the noise. . . . Basically, 
investigators who are looking into their own minds (under special conditions) 
may mistake the sources of ‘new’ information within their own minds as if those 
sources were outside the head. This process in psychology is called ‘projection’” 
(105-6).   
 In the context of the research protocols for the scientific practices under 
discussion in The Mind of the Dolphin, once again, projection is basically a 
problem, not simply insofar as it may corrupt the experiential data being collected 
and examined, but also insofar as one may be tempted to contemplate a 
hypothesis that hallucinated messages are in fact offers of communication arriving 
through unknown, immaterial channels. Here in some of the weirdest passages of 
this text, Lilly darkly intimates, although in the mode of rational negation, that 
communication with dolphins could conceivably occur—especially if all efforts at 
normal symbolic exchange yield a null result—through a paranormal or telepathic 
medium: 
If one is watching “noise” at the logical level, he can sometimes 
“hear messages,” as if he were being spoken to by other persons 
and these persons were telling him some important message… 
                                                          
11
 Lilly’s exposition of noise makes his equation between meaning and information 
explicit: “In the standard theory, ‘noise’ . . . is a form of energy in which no part can be 
taken, no matter how chosen, as conveying any meaning whatsoever. Physical noise is 
that set of signals which, when received by a mind, generates no new information in 
that mind” (105).  
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Fundamentally, then, we must eliminate, insofar as our brains and 
minds and their scientific investigation are concerned, a hypothesis 
which says that the noise coming from inside one’s own mind and 
brain can be “signals caused by direct mental influence of other 
minds without the interposition of the usual modes and media of 
communication.” (106) 
Lilly continues for a number of pages in this vein of the logical dismissal of as 
well as denial of evidence for uncanny communication, ostensibly to underscore 
the comprehensive reach of his theorizations and rigor of his experimental 
procedures. He arrives at a declaration of practical agnosticism: “My own position 
about religion is the same as my position about ESP [“extra-sensory perception”] 
and thought transference. Until I have empirical, down-to-earth, hard-nosed 
information thrust upon me, I will maintain a position of not knowing; such 
thinking also belongs in the area of the unknown” (110).  
 Nonetheless, at this point in the text a reader could still wonder why Lilly 
wants to take his discussion on a long detour into such outlandish matters. The 
Mind of the Dolphin does not really answer that question, although a bit later, in 
chapter 5, the essential clue is given when Lilly provides a short work-up of the 
parallel research project that has been moving in and out of focus between the 
lines of this text. Now shifting into a first-person narration, he remarks that “after 
many exposures to the physical isolation under ideal physical conditions, I was 
able to overcome self-created mental discomfort to a certain extent. I learned a 
lesson about our minds as follows: Our huge computers are, to a certain extent, 
self-metaprogramming and self-programming” (121). Right here Lilly provided a 
footnote to an early version of the second book-length text he completed in 1967. 
This was the obligatory final research report composed at the conclusion of his 
five-year Career Award from the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH), 
which award had been largely financing the CRI since 1962. In Lilly’s footnote, 
the title is given as The Human Biocomputer: Programming and 
Metaprogramming (Theory and Experiments with LSD-25).12 
 An extended consideration of this major intertext must wait for another 
occasion. Instead, by way of conclusion for the moment, I will move directly to a 
section of Programming and Metaprogramming that overlaps some key topics we 
have been tracking through the discourse of communication in The Mind of the 
Dolphin. In particular, we will look at some passages from chapter 8, “Basic 
Effects of LSD-25 on the Biocomputer: Noise as the Basic Energy for Projection 
                                                          
12
 Lilly addresses this work’s “curious history” in his 1972 foreword to the second edition 
of Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer: Theory and 
Experiments (New York: Bantam, 1974), v. I will quote the text from this 1974 edition.  
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Techniques.” The wording of the title indicates the crux of the difference between 
the two treatments. In the dolphin book, invested in the maintenance of a baseline 
of normal scientificity, projection is presented primarily if not entirely as a source 
of aberration in the data collected, a problem factor to be controlled. But what 
Lilly discovered and subsequently explored in the isolation work was that, 
depending on the kind of experiment one had in mind, projection need not be 
controlled for but simply itself controlled as a research technique. All the more so 
under the radical suggestibility induced by LSD, projection offered a 
phenomenological resource that could itself be “programmed” and so tested 
experimentally for the purpose of sounding the limits of possible belief. 
 In the following passages from Programming and Metaprogramming, 
Lilly adverts to the signal/noise ratio, but with some major differences. Whereas 
in the dolphin book, the noise source was located “in the external world . . . by 
either looking at a very noisy visually presented process or by listening to a very 
noisy acoustically presented process” (105), in the biocomputer text, the noise 
source is fully internalized. It is in fact the form of the contribution LSD makes, 
an amplification of “the noise level of the mind itself” (82):  
In the analysis of the effects of LSD-25 on the human mind, a 
reasonable hypothesis states that the effect of these substances on 
the human computer is to introduce white noise (in the sense of 
randomly varying energy containing no signals of itself) in specific 
systems in the computer. . . .  The major operative principle seems 
to be that the human computer operates in such a way as to 
make signals out of noise and thus to create information out of 
random energies where there was no signal; this is the 
“projection principle”; noise is creatively used in non-noise 
models. (80-82; emphasis in the original). 
Later on the same page Lilly introduces a long passage from a 1962 paper by 
Heinz von Foerster, “Bio-Logic,” in order to cite the latter’s argument for the 
hypothesis that some percentage “‘of all operations in the brain are afflicted with 
an intrinsic noise figure which has to be taken care of in one way or another’” 
(83).13 But let us also jump forward for a moment to von Foerster’s justly famous 
1974 paper “On Constructing a Reality,” to sample what may be its own 
reciprocating of Lilly’s attention. A section on “Computation” ends with the 
observation that “In ‘biological computers’ the programs may themselves be 
computed on. This leads to the concepts of ‘metaprograms,’ ‘meta-
                                                          
13
 Lilly cites from Heinz von Foerster, “Bio-Logic,” in Biological Prototypes and 
Synthetic Systems, volume 1, eds. Eugene E. Bernard and Morley R. Kare (New York: 
Plenum Press, 1962), 1-12. 
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metaprograms,’ and so on. This, of course, is the consequence of the inherent 
recursive organization of these systems” (224). The following section on 
“Closure” formulates a “postulate of cognitive homeostasis” that reads like a 
straightforward generalization of the bio-computational principle underlying the 
statements Lilly’s text placed in bold font above. Von Foerster writes: “The 
nervous system is organized (or organizes itself) so that it computes a stable 
reality” (225).  
 The postulate of cognitive homeostasis would of course hold, as much as 
may be possible, under relatively extreme conditions such as LSD’s amplification 
of the white noise perceived by the mind amidst any other signals. And so, as 
Lilly lists off the basic effects of LSD-25 on the biocomputer, “One can thus 
‘explain’ the apparent speed-up of subjective time; the enhancement of colors and 
detail in perceptions of the real world; the production of illusions; . . . the 
projection of emotional expression onto other real persons; the synesthesia of 
music to visual projections; the feeling of ‘oneness with the universe’; apparent 
ESP effects; communications from ‘beings other than humans’” (80). While 
caution over seduction by misconstrued projections remains, in Programming and 
Metaprogramming the projection process itself becomes an openly and open-
endedly self-experimental technique, a voluntary search for the limits of mental 
experience that the adept metaprogrammer of one’s own biocomputer (brain) can 
induce: “One can . . . detect the noise level of the mind itself and use it for 
cognitional projections rather than sense-organ-data projections” (82).  
 Put another way, projection is a problem only if the goal being sought is 
communication in an interaction system, such as that constellated by the 
interspecies effort. In the end, communication research with dolphins ran aground 
against its own improbability, not to mention Lilly’s increasingly precipitous loss 
of institutional support as the outlandish aspects of his dolphin work came to 
loom larger than its initial promise and appealing pathos.14 Once Lilly turned the 
“projection principle” from a side-effect into a primary technique for self-
experimentation on the limits of belief, the matter of communication was no 
longer the object of the science but simply the process of its symbolically-
mediated presentation beyond the self. If Lilly’s proactive treatment of 
“cognitional projections” upon the noise of the mind directly anticipated some 
aspects of von Foerster’s mature contribution to the discourse of systems theory, 
the epistemological constructivism of second-order cybernetics, it did so in an 
activist mode of psychic exploration, a mode that the necessary protocols of 
communication research could only hinder and impede. Ever the intellectual 
sophisticate, von Foerster successfully moderated and streamlined the more outré 
                                                          
14
 For copious detail on this score, see Burnett, Sounding of the Whale, chapter 6. 
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elements of his friend Lilly’s psychonautical adventures, extracting their gist and 
making it eventually into a resource for social systems theory’s autopoietic 
coupling of the discourses of consciousness and communication.  
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